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Compulsory loyalty? 
Accountability, citizenship 
and the BBC 
Richard Collins* 
Introduction 
Throughout the period 2004-2006 UK media policy debates were 
dominated by consideration of the governance, accountability and role of the 
BBC in Parliamentary and other enquiries (see, inter alia, BBC 2004, Cox 
2004, DCMS 2004, 2005, 2005a, 2006, 2006a, House of Commons 2004, 
House of Lords 2005) to consider the terms of the BBC’s new Charter. The 
Government has published the terms of a proposed new BBC “constitution”, 
a new Charter and Agreement (see 
http://www.bbccharterreview.org.uk/publica- 
tions/cr_pubs/pub_draftrc_revisedjuly06.html on 27.8.2006) but though these 
include a new body, the BBC Trust, to replace the present BBC Board of 
Governors they do not include significant changes in BBC accountability. 
The conservatism of the Government’s proposals reflects the genuine 
difficulties in devising durable forms of public sector accountability and the 
dominant conceptual framing of broadcasting citizenship in the UK. 
                         
*  Professor of Media Studies, The Open University, UK. 
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The discussion below draws on Warnock’s (1974) notion of two part 
accountability (provision of information and ability to exercise sanctions) 
and on both Hirschman’s (1970) and Thompson’s (2003) triadic distinc-
tions (respectively between exit, voice and loyalty and hierarchical, market 
and network forms of governance). I ask how the accountability require-
ments of giving and holding to account exercised in the contexts defined by 
Hirschman and Thompson and focus on the role of trust (drawing on 
O’Neill’s 2002 “A question of trust”). In contrast to the “strong” framing of 
the normative conception of the consumer (see Peacock 1986 and also Pot-
ter 1988 and Sargant 1992 and 1993) as an active user who can hold institu-
tions to account in a well functioning market the citizen in broadcasting is 
constructed (following Marshall 1981) merely as the object of the distribu-
tion of welfare rather than as an active agent able to hold providers to 
account. 
BBC Charter review 
The forthcoming expiry of the BBC’s Royal Charter in late 2006 has 
provoked an intense and wide ranging debate about UK broadcasting policy 
and the role, funding and constitution of the BBC. This debate has taken 
place in a context where, for the past two and a half decades, institutional 
co-ordination and governance through markets has greatly increased (libe-
ralisation and privatisation) and hierarchical “command and control” gover-
nance has correspondingly diminished and in which much attention has 
been given to the accountability (substantial number) of public sector insti-
tutions which remain subject to hierarchical governance and organisation. 
BBC accountability of the BBC figured prominently among the issues 
arising from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s (DCMS) public 
consultation,1 Jonathan Zeff, Head of Broadcasting Policy at DCMS stated: 
The governance and regulation of the BBC was obviously one of the key areas of 
concern….. there was a strong emphasis on the importance of the BBC’s in-
                         
1  See several relevant documents including an analysis of consultation responses at 
http://www.bbccharterreview.org.uk/publications/cr_pubs/pub_gp_summaryresponses.html 
on 12.4.2006. 
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dependence, and there was also clear evidence of a general desire for greater 
accountability to viewers and listeners, for ensuring that the interests of licence-
fee payers are properly represented, and for greater transparency in the way that 
the BBC operates.2 
Ubiqus, the company undertaking the consultation, summarised 
respondents’ concerns and stated: 
“The majority of respondents answering this question [ie about governance RC] 
wanted the Governors to be more directly accountable to and representative of 
the general public. This was the key recommendation from the public” (Ubiqus 
2004: 33).3 
Such testimony to dissatisfaction reflects both a general issue in 
broadcasting policy and regulation in democratic and pluralist societies and 
the complexity, and sometimes obscurity, of established arrangements for 
holding the BBC to account in which three institutions play a major role – 
that is Government, Ofcom and the BBC’s own Governors. 
The Government controls the BBC’s public funding by setting the level, 
and duration, of the licence fee settlement. It determines the BBC’s remit by 
defining the terms under which the BBC operates, that is the Royal Charter 
and Agreement between the BBC and the Government (DNH 1996 and see 
also http://www.bbc.co.uk/info/policies/charter/ on 19.6.2006). It appoints 
the BBC’s Governors and the Ministry responsible for the BBC, the DCMS, 
has power of approval over new BBC services. In contrast to the important 
role played by Government in setting the terms on which the BBC operates, 
Parliament has few powers and responsibilities. 
The BBC is also subject to Ofcom, the UK’s statutory regulator for 
electronic media and communications, in respect of so called Tier 1 (harm 
and offence. fairness and privacy) and Tier 2 matters (notably programme 
production quotas) and (via provisions in the BBC’s Agreement with the 
Secretary of State) is also bound to adhere to the standards in Ofcom’s 
                         
2  At The Future of the BBC: Westminster Media Forum Consultation Seminar on the Green 
Paper. June 2005. 
3  It may be unwise to rely on the views expressed on BBC governance and accountability in 
the consultation. Analysis of responses by Ubiqus (2004: 29) found not only that the question 
about governance and accountability “was unanswered by the majority of respondents” but 
that “In the main, responses demonstrated an overwhelming lack of knowledge”. 
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Broadcasting Code (at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv/ifi/codes/bcode/ on 
21.6.2006). Ofcom has power to issue directions to, and impose a fine of up 
to £250,000 on, the BBC but has fewer powers over the BBC than it has 
over other broadcasters.4 
The third element in BBC accountability is the BBC’s Board of 
Governors. The Governors are the BBC for legal purposes and are thus 
responsible for all aspects of BBC activity. Among the chief deficiencies 
perceived under these arrangements are the Governors’ dual roles of 
governance and regulation (can complainants, whether about accuracy or 
fair trading or other matters, be assured of fair treatment when the 
adjudicating body is the governing body?). 
Proposals for change 
The Government proposes to change established arrangements by 
replacing the Governors by a BBC Trust and a separately constituted BBC 
Executive. The Trust will regulate accuracy and impartiality of programme 
content, define the scope of the BBC’s activities (in service licences, purpose 
remits and through its power to authorise new services), hold the Executive to 
account and appoint the Chair of the Executive Board (see DCMS 2006). The 
Trust will be charged with improving the transparency of the BBC and with a 
duty to consult licence fee payers. However, viewers’ and listeners’ powers 
to hold the BBC to account, either directly or indirectly through their 
representatives in Parliament will not change. 
The Government’s proposed changes do not seem commensurate with 
either the public’s wish for the BBC’s Governors to be “more directly 
accountable to and representative of the general public” (Ubiqus 2004: 33) or 
the dissatisfaction expressed by many of the large number of enquiries which 
considered the future of the BBC in the course of Charter review. At the time of 
writing, the Trust remains to be constituted and it’s therefore not yet clear how 
                         
4  The BBC is also subject to Ofcom (which is the lead competition regulator for the 
communications sector) in respect of the Competition Act 1998 and Enterprise Act 2002 but 
the BBC’s public service and public sector status mean that some provisions of the 
Competition Act 1998 and Enterprise Act 2002 are of uncertain application (see Cave, 
Collins and Crowther 2004). 
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it will discharge its responsibilities but what seems to be envisaged is a 
combination of regular public consultation and straightforward hierarchical, top 
down, oversight of management by the Trust. The Government’s power to 
define the BBC’ mandate, appoint its Governors and set the level and term of 
the licence fee and Ofcom’s powers to issue directions and to fine the BBC will 
remain unchanged. Like the Board of Governors which preceded it, the Trust 
will discharge both regulatory and governance responsibilities. But the Trust 
will be different from the Governors in that it will be more clearly separated 
from management, more clearly in command and will have explicit duties to 
consult licence fee payers. Moreover, the Trust will enjoy more clearly defined 
and more significant authority than did the Governors through its powers to 
attach conditions to service licences, deny approval to new services, appoint the 
Chair of the BBC Executive and, as the Government has stated, have the final 
word (DCMS 2006: 51). 
Hierarchy or Market? Accountability through voice and exit 
The substantial continuities between the old and proposed new 
governance and regulatory regime reflect general problems in making public 
sector institutions effectively accountable to those whom they serve as well 
as issues specific to the BBC. Among the general problems are, as is well 
known, the inapplicability of price based purchaser/provider relationships, 
the remoteness of large scale institutions from users, the imperfect 
effectiveness of accountability through Parliament or other elected bodies. 
Moreover, there are further problems which arise from both the lack of direct 
contact between provider and user intrinsic to broadcasting and the need to 
safeguard the BBC’s journalistic and editorial independence. The latter 
consideration militates against control by Parliamentary and/or by any new 
elected, broadcasting specific, body which might be subject to capture by an 
unrepresentative group or interest. 
What’s meant by the terms “accountability”, “hierarchical governance” 
and “market governance”? Mary Warnock5 argued that accountability consists 
in two elements – an entitlement to knowledge and a power to impose 
sanctions. She stated: 
                         
5  Warnock is a member of the House of Lords, a philosopher of established reputation and 
served as a Member of the Independent Broadcasting Authority. 
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A is accountable to B where B has entrusted to A some duty (especially in regard 
to the spending of money) and where, if A fails to fulfil this duty, B has some 
sanction which he may use against A. This is one necessary part of it. But it 
follows that B has a right to be exactly informed of what A has done towards 
fulfilling his duty (Warnock 1974: 2). 
Warnock’s model could be restated as a duty to give an account (provide 
information) and be held to account (be subject to sanction). Under the 
tutelage of the proposed BBC Trust, licence fee payers should be better 
informed, the BBC will be required to give a fuller account of itself to the 
public, but licence fee payers’ ability to exercise sanctions, to hold the BBC 
to account, will change little. One element of Warnock’s definition may be 
better satisfied, ie provision of information, but powers of sanction will 
remain with the Government, Ofcom and the Trust (the successor to the 
Governors) rather than with the licence fee payer. 
As to the terms hierarchy and markets, governance, or control, of 
institutions may be exercised through a variety of different forms of co-
ordination notably hierarchies (command and control), markets or networks 
(Thompson 2003) or a combination thereof. Accountability under 
hierarchical governance is generally upward whereas accountability in 
market governance is usually downward. Under network governance, 
accountability is customarily exercised through collaborative relationships 
and practices characterised by trust between the parties – one might call this 
horizontal accountability. 
It is a truism to observe that one of the “grand narratives” of UK public 
sector governance over the last quarter of a century has been a re-balancing 
towards market and away from hierarchical governance (see, for example, 
Moran 2003). This has been manifested both through a re-engineering of the 
internal relationships of public sector bodies to embody the precepts of “new 
public management” (NPM) on private sector lines (Osborne and Gaebler 
1992) as well as through liberalisation and privatisation which reshaped 
public bodies’ outward facing relationships. The growing salience of market, 
rather than hierarchical, governance in the media and communications sector 
has been shaped both by technological change and by government policy. 
Government policy has shifted from inhibiting entry, by licencing of firms, to 
general authorisation and promotion of entry: in both broadcasting and 
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telecommunications monopoly (or duopoly) has given way to competition 
between hundreds of firms. 
This is not to state that markets have completely displaced hierarchy, but 
rather that, the straightforward command and control systems of hierarchical 
governance which obtained 50 years ago for broadcasting, post and 
telecommunications, (that is all UK media and communications except the 
print sector), have given way to a complex intersection of different 
governance systems with market (and network) governance assuming a much 
greater role than before. In domains where, traditionally, hierarchical 
governance prevailed there has been a pronounced shift towards market 
governance and in some sectors, notably the Internet, a shift towards network 
governance and co-regulation.6 UK broadcasting including the BBC has 
come increasingly to be measured against a market template. 
Market governance 
In broadcasting, the most powerful and influential case for adoption of 
market governance and accountability in the UK was made by the Peacock 
Committee in 1986. Peacock (1986) recommended increasing contestability 
in broadcasting markets and downward accountability to viewers and 
listeners. Peacock’s argument rested on two propositions, first that viewers 
and listeners are well able to identify their own needs and interests and thus 
should be sovereign and, second that, once created, well functioning 
broadcasting markets would enable viewers and listeners effectively to hold 
broadcasters to account through the price system which would express the 
intensities of their preferences.7 
But, although governance of media and communications over the last 25 
years increasingly has been undertaken through markets (with accountability 
                         
6  Co-regulation is also growing in broadcasting, for example Ofcom has “outsourced” 
regulation of television advertising to the private sector self-regulatory body the Broadcast 
Committee of Advertising Practice (BCAP). 
7  The Peacock Committee’s argument looked forward to the advent of subscription television 
but radio posed different problems. The Committee proposed that radio should be financed 
by a licence fee for car radios (and advertising). However the licence fee method would 
scarcely advance consumer sovereignty and accountability. 
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to users expressed through prices), market governance has notable 
deficiencies. Each of the two principal means of market funding of 
broadcasting, advertising and subscription, deny users the ability to express 
effectively their preferences through prices. Advertising financed 
programmes and services tend to respond to the interests of the advertisers 
and to engender clustering of programmes and services in a middle range (the 
“Hotelling” effect) rather than matching offer and demand effectively (see, 
inter alia, Peacock 1986, Collins, Garnham and Locksley 1988). Subscription 
finance, though in theory well fitted to empowering users, tends to bundle 
services meaning that consumers have to purchase unwanted products and 
services if they are to secure those they do want and they also have to defray 
the transaction costs intrinsic to subscription finance. Further, both 
advertising and subscription funded services tend to super-serve the relatively 
wealthy and under-serve the relatively poor. Moreover, broadcasting markets 
may be distorted by dominant firms exercising market power in any or all 
areas of a complex supply chain (including content, encryption, electronic 
programme guides, subscription management, platform control) to chill 
and/or foreclose entry to broadcasting markets to the detriment of consumers 
(see, inter alia, Cox 2004: 50-53). 
These deficiencies in market governance of broadcasting have justified 
the continued public service and public sector presence in UK broadcasting 
but latterly the issues of proportionality (the appropriate size of the public 
element in broadcasting) and accountability have increasingly figured in UK 
broadcasting policy debates. 
Exit, voice and loyalty 
In 1970 Albert Hirschman published his “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” 
(Hirschman 1970) in which he identifies three ways in which stakeholders 
can hold institutions to account – through exercise of what he called “exit”, 
“voice” and “loyalty”. Different governance systems provide different means 
for stakeholders to signal their preferences by exiting from the relationship 
(eg by ceasing to buy products and services), making their voice heard (eg by 
voting) or by demonstrating their loyalty (doing nothing in circumstances 
where the alternatives of exit and/or voice are available). 
 R. Collins – Compulsory loyalty? Accountability, citizenship and the BBC 
 
89 
If “loyalty” is regarded as a null option (if one is loyal then one does 
not exercise voice or exit) “exit” is principally an option to be exercised 
through market systems of accountability and “voice” is principally an 
option to be exercised through hierarchical systems of accountability.  
Or put more pithily, exit is exercised through price and voice through 
politics. Applying Hirschman’s model to broadcasting shows that there are 
significant inadequacies in the prevailing accountability mechanisms of 
both market and hierarchical systems. In market systems, whether 
advertising or subscription funded, viewers and listeners are unable 
effectively exercise the sanction of voice (though they may write, ‘phone in 
or formally complain) but they do have exit sanction powers. In advertising 
funded systems their exit reduces revenue from advertisers. In subscription 
funded systems exit has direct and adverse financial consequences for 
broadcasters. 
For the BBC, hierarchically organised and funded, viewers and listeners 
have few opportunities to either exercise voice or exit.8 They are unable to 
represent their preferences to the BBC, ie exercise voice, because the BBC 
lacks the institutional forms of either joint stock companies (shareholders’ 
meetings, election of directors, reporting requirements defined by stock 
exchanges and financial regulators) or democratic politics (notably the 
election of representatives) through which “voice” can be expressed. And nor 
are viewers, licence fee payers,9 able to lawfully exit from their relationship 
with the BBC (other than by abstaining from all television consumption). 
In Hirschman’s terms, the public is unable effectively to hold the BBC to 
account because it is unable to exercise either voice or exit. Public 
disenfranchisement appears increasingly anomalous as devices such as 
computers and mobile ‘phones and the Internet enable users to more 
effectively control consumption and as voice (and often exit) accountability 
                         
8  True, viewers and listeners may cease to consume BBC programmes but this has no obvious 
financial impact on the BBC (BBC funding has risen over the last decade although its share 
of television, but not radio, consumption has fallen). However, it seems likely that there is a 
“tipping point” at which compulsory licence fee funding would cease to have legitimacy 
because too few watched or listened to BBC services. That point has yet to be reached. 
9  The licence fee is a charge only on television viewers – currently there is no radio licence in 
the UK. The licence fee is formally classified as a tax by the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS 2006). 
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is augmented in other public sector institutions. Loyalty, rather than being 
chosen, is made compulsory. 
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The BBC, trust and horizontal accountability 
The BBC enjoys a very special status as a publicly owned body which is 
weakly subject to external hierarchical governance and upward accountability 
and is not subject to market governance and downward responsibility to 
users. The self-regulatory and self-authorising status of the BBC has rested 
on public trust in the BBC rather than on the ability of the public to hold the 
BBC to account through exercise of either exit or voice. How widely is the 
BBC trusted and how well founded is that trust? 
O’Neill (2002) has persuasively argued that trust based systems of 
governance have formidable advantages and that when trust is present formal 
accountability is not required. She also, cleverly, shows that formal systems 
of accountability are in the end based on trust because, in the end, all 
accountability chains have to end somewhere and there be anchored in a final 
trusted authority. Though the BBC remains among the best trusted of UK 
organisations it has neither been immune from the pervasive mistrust and 
suspicion which O’Neill has argued “have spread across all areas of life” 
(O’Neill 2002: 8) nor has it been innocent of actions which have been 
corrosive of trust. 
Mori research (Mori 2003: 12) found that television was second only to 
the army among trusted institutions in the UK (and radio followed fourth 
after the police). Although neither the radio nor the television about which 
Mori asked respondents maps perfectly onto the BBC it seems highly 
unlikely that were the BBC (with c 38% of television consumption and c53% 
of radio consumption) to be widely mistrusted Mori would not have found 
such high levels of general trust in broadcasting. YouGov found,10 in a poll 
conducted in January 2005, that the BBC is “still the most trusted for news” 
(though Sky News is more trusted than the BBC’s News 24). Abundant 
testimony to the high levels of public trust in the BBC was also evident at the 
time of the Gilligan affair and the subsequent Hutton enquiry when public 
sentiment inclined towards the BBC rather than the Government. 
                         
10  YouGov press release at http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/OMI050101003_2.pdf on 
27.2.2006. See also (BBC 2004a: 45). 
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Nonetheless, Lord Hutton’s probe (Hutton 2004) into the “Gilligan 
affair” revealed how some aspects of the BBC’s journalistic and editorial 
procedures had fallen short of the high standards on which public trust has 
been based.11 Others have observed that in some respects the BBC’s 
procedures fall short of those adopted by other highly reputed news 
organisations – see, for example, BBC 2006). Further, O’Neill (2004a) has 
observed that: 
Reuters’ journalists…. face disciplines that those who work for the BBC…. do 
not face. Journalists and editors working for ….. the BBC do not routinely have 
to declare their interests, or their conflicts of interest to their managers (let alone 
their audiences) or to withdraw from broadcasting on topics in which they have a 
financial interest. 
Different aspects of BBC conduct, such as those revealed in the PKF  
report on BBC funding (DCMS 2006b) and some of the National Audit  
Office’s (NAO) reports on value for money (see http://www.bbcgovernors. 
co.uk/docs/rev_valueformoney.html on 20.6.2006) achieved by the BBC, 
have also qualified public trust in the BBC. Further pillars of the BBC’s 
raison d’etre, such as the public service quality and character of its 
programmes have also come under criticism, for example the Green Paper 
stated that BBC programmes are “too dull, or too copy-cat of formats 
working perfectly adequately” (DCMS 2005a: 2).12 Moreover, recent 
enquiries into specific aspects of BBC journalism (such as BBC reporting 
of the European Union and the Israel/Palestine conflict – see BBC 2005b 
and 2006)13 also found grounds for criticism and the sheer volume of recent 
studies and enquiries into the BBC suggest some generalised disquiet about 
aspects of its performance and grounds. The BBC and its proponents, on 
                         
11  The BBC’s own reflections on its journalistic and editorial practices, the Neil Report, (BBC 
2004b) constructively acknowledged that the BBC had a case to answer and that its 
procedures and training should be improved (the BBC has adopted the Neil Report and begun 
to implement its recommendations). 
12  See also inter alia BBC 2005, 2006, DFID 2002, Cox 2004: 64. 
13  To invoke the findings of National Audit Office studies of the BBC’s operational 
performance and the findings of enquiries into the quality and character of BBC journalism 
may suggest that the BBC is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. There can be no 
doubt that the commissioning, formally by the Governors, and publication of such studies 
betokens a laudable transparency in BBC governance and perhaps a healthy institutional 
culture of self-criticism. 
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the other hand, have often argued that the BBC’s editorial independence 
(the desirability of which is very seldom challenged) depends on its self-
authorising “independent” status. But, as the House of Commons Select 
Committee observed, there is no necessary incompatibility between 
independence and accountability. The Committee claimed that 
“independence does not by any means absolve the BBC from ex post 
accountability for its performance and its use of a substantial amount of the 
public’s money” (House of Commons 2004: 64). 
Although neither well founded trust in the BBC nor a well functioning 
system of formal accountability to viewers and listeners can be taken for 
granted, the process of Charter review 2004-6 itself has meant that the BBC 
has been subject to a much higher degree of external scrutiny than is 
usually the case. This in itself is a form of holding to account, and one 
which has elicited much information and thus made significant steps 
towards satisfying one of Warnock’s two components of accountability – 
provision of information. Although Charter review takes place infrequently 
(the current Charter dates from 1996 and expires in 2006), the BBC is also 
subject to what might be called a perpetual plebiscite on the part of viewers 
and listeners (as it competes for their attention against alternative viewing 
and listening opportunities) though an adverse verdict in such a plebiscite 
has not, yet, been attended by the exercise of sanctions. However, in spite 
of the force of such informal systems of accountability the BBC remains 
strikingly insulated from direct accountability to its users. 
Club governance and (in)competent viewers and listeners 
The complex articulation of different systems of holding the BBC to 
account exist in a context of accumulating evidence that high levels of 
public trust in the BBC are not grounded in consistently high levels of BBC 
performance. O’Neill’s proposition “Traditional approaches to compliance 
relied heavily on cultures of trust” (O’Neill 2005: 1) does much to explain 
both why formal systems of holding the BBC to account have been patchy 
and underdeveloped and why there are now unprecedented levels of 
demand for greater formality and effectiveness in BBC accountability 
mechanisms. 
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The BBC’s governance arrangements reflect the survival of “club 
governance” (Marquand 1988, Moran 2003) that is governance based on 
shared understandings, assumptions and trust between parties which 
Marquand described as: 
The atmosphere of British government was that of a club, whose members 
trusted each other to observe the spirit of the club rules; the notion that the 
principles underlying the rules should be clearly defined and publicly proclaimed 
was profoundly alien (Marquand: 1988: 178). 
Club governance, epitomised by UK broadcasting Moran (2003), 
exemplifies the demerits of trust based systems. But, as O’Neill and Power 
(1997) have pointed out alternatives to trust based accountability have 
notable demerits – see their persuasive critiques of target setting, 
quantification and the intrusive apparatus and perverse outcomes of the 
“audit society”. These demerits may go far to explain the longevity of 
established, albeit creaky and complex, arrangements in respect of the BBC. 
Transparency and consultation 
The BBC has acknowledged that it has “historically been rather closed as 
an institution” (BBC 2004: 19) and that reform should “make the BBC more 
responsive and accountable to the British public” (BBC 2004: 23). Both the 
BBC, in “Building Public Value” and the Government, in the Green Paper, 
have proposed to improve BBC accountability to its viewers and listeners by 
providing more information, that is better giving an account – one dimension 
of Warnock’s stipulation. The BBC has proposed (BBC 2004: around 131) to 
strengthen its established advisory councils, institute a tri-annual public value 
survey by polling a large representative sample of the UK population and to 
improve complaints handling. The Government, in the Green Paper (DCMS 
2005a: around 12), proposed that deliberative research should inform the 
BBC’s governing body’s major decisions, that meetings of the Trust should 
take place in public and/or be webcast and more speculatively canvassed the 
possibility of electing members of the BBC’s advisory councils and of 
publishing the voting records of Trust members. The Government also 
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advocated improved complaints handling by the BBC.14 Rather than 
endowing viewers and listeners with the power to hold the BBC to account, 
the Government proposes to keep this power with the Trust, the successor to 
the BBC Governors and the body which, formally and legally is the BBC, 
and charge the Trust with to give a better account of the BBC to viewers and 
listeners than did the Governors. 
Proposed changes to the BBC’s governance seldom include 
strengthening, whether through voice or exit, the power of viewers and 
listeners to hold the BBC to account. Rather, in varying degrees, they 
advocate revisions to the established system of upward, hierarchical, 
accountability rather than strengthening downward accountability to viewers 
and listeners, whether through market, exit, or hierarchy, voice. This stance 
towards the BBC contrasts with a general social trend (see Blaug, Horner and 
Lekhi 2006) towards greater user and citizen participation in the 
determination of policy and practice of public sector institutions. 
Why should the BBC be an exception to this trend? Essentially because 
viewers and listeners are not though to be competent judges of their own 
needs and interests. In part this reflects a general relationship between 
professional experts and non-experts – it’s appropriate and customary for 
non-experts to defer to experts – in education, medicine, law and other 
domains. In part it reflects the BBC’s sedulous guardianship of its 
independence, recently exemplified in its rejection (on the grounds that the 
electoral process might be subject to capture) of election of members of its 
advisory committees.15 In part it’s a legacy of Reith’s notion of users of BBC 
services as incompetent to judge their own needs.16 And in part an aspect of 
                         
14  Complaints handling by public bodies was the subject of a study by the National Audit 
Office (NAO) but the BBC was not among the 277 public bodies surveyed by the NAO in its 
study “Citizen Redress” (NAO 2005). Nonetheless, the BBC has implemented important 
improvements in its complaints handling. 
15  All the BBC’s (and BBC appointed) advisory bodies have refused to brook election of their 
members (BBC 2005a: 94, 97, 100, 103). And the BBC, perhaps rather ventriloquistically, 
supported them (BBC 2005a: 59). 
16  Reith’s comment provides a representative flavour of this sentiment: “In earliest years 
accused of setting out to give the public not what it wanted but what the BBC thought it 
should have, the answer was that few knew what they wanted, fewer what they needed” 
(Reith 1949: 101). 
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the BBC’s role as provider of “merit goods”:17 individuals are likely to 
“under demand” merit goods, goods and services beneficial to society as a 
whole, when greater benefits accrue to society than accrue to the individuals 
making the demand decisions. 
Viewing users of broadcasting services as incompetent to decide leads 
necessarily to a rejection of viewer and listener sovereignty over the BBC. But 
such a conception of the viewer and listener risks leaving the BBC marooned as 
an isolated relic of “club governance” and under-developed downward 
accountability at a time when other public sector bodies (see, inter alia the 
Public and Patient Involvement forums established by all NHS Trusts and the 
Home Office’s requirement that the police engage and involve communities in 
crime reduction and priority setting. [See Department of Health 2003 and 
Home Office 2004]) are strengthening their accountability to users and when 
consumer sovereignty is more and more salient an objective in market 
governance. 
The consumer and the citizen in broadcasting 
The growth of the market sector in communications (and the impact of 
New Public Management and privatisation on the public sector) has led some 
to defend the BBC as a public sector bastion distinguished by its 
“citizenship” orientation and values as opposed to the “consumer” values and 
orientation of the market sector.18 In consequence the user of broadcasting 
services has come to be conceived dualistically as both a citizen and as a 
                         
17  “Merit goods”, in the language of neo-classical economics, are goods which confer long term 
benefits but which no individual thinks worth paying for. Examples include high culture, 
scientific research, education etc. Because free markets tend to undersupply merit goods it's 
generally accepted that there is a legitimate role for the state in providing them – hence 
public funding for education, the arts, research and public service broadcasting. Without the 
justification afforded by its provision of merit goods the legitimacy of both public funding 
and a system of governance offering those who pay few opportunities either to “exit” or 
exercise their “voice” (see Hirschman 1970). 
18  Pattie, Seyd and Whitely (2004: 77) sensibly acknowledge the porous boundaries between 
the notions of consumer and citizen when observing that “in their day to day consumption 
behaviour they [ie people in the UK RC] are acting politically” and argue that the nature of 
political participation in the UK “makes it meaningful to talk about ‘consumer citizenship’” 
(Pattie, Seyd and Whitely 2004: 267). 
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consumer (or as a hybrid citizen/consumer) with different accountability 
relationships attaching to each identity. 
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Accountability to consumers, normatively, is to be realised by enabling 
consumers to make (or not make) purchases from one or more of a number of 
competing providers. Within this sort of normative schema public service 
broadcasting, and the BBC in particular, looks at best somewhat odd and at 
worst appears as a major obstacle standing in the way of a well functioning 
market through which consumers are able to hold producers and providers 
accountable through the price system. Accountability to citizens, on the other 
hand, is more difficult to define (but see Calabrese and Burgelman 2003, 
Hartley 1999, Murdock 1999, 1999a, 2004, Stevenson 2003) and to realise. 
The term “citizen” has been given a particular inflection in discussions of UK 
broadcasting policy and this inflection has marginalised accountability 
questions. The notion of citizenship as a power to share in decision making 
(see inter alia Brinckmann 1930) or, in Hirschman’s terms to exercise voice, 
has scarcely been considered, still less implemented. Perhaps the fear of what 
Heller (1978: 2) wittily identified as the unwelcome possibility of a 
“Hobbesian state of anarchy and disruption” which might attend the exercise 
of a “public right to intervene in the management of services” is the reason 
for this absence. Fear of Hobbesian horror, rather than fear of “public service 
bureaucracies that are insulated from public or parliamentary scrutiny and 
effectively independent in their pursuit of organisational objectives and 
growth” (Heller 1978: 2) has been stronger in informing public policy and 
practice. 
Consumer and citizen 
The shift towards market, and away from hierarchical, governance in 
broadcasting has led to what Murdock called “the figure of the consumer and 
the ideology of consumerism” (Murdock 1999:10) rising in salience. 
Consumerism, Murdock proposes, is hostile to citizenship and the values 
implied in the category “citizen”: consumerism “privileges personal spending 
over social and political participation, and addresses viewers as shoppers rather 
than as members of intersecting moral communities” and “by equating social 
differences with variations in choice and style it negates any attempt to arrive at 
a conception of the ‘common good’ based on the negotiation of differences in 
their full complexity” (Murdock 1999: 10). This view, though representative, 
acknowledges insufficiently the concern for liberty rather than self-interested 
consumption, which has informed the major UK arguments for consumer 
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sovereignty in broadcasting and notably the report of the Peacock Committee in 
1986. Further, it masks the complementarities between “citizenship” and 
“consumer” values in the arguments advanced by proponents of the consumer 
interest (see, for example, NCC 1993, Potter 1988, and Sargant 1992, 1993). 
Moreover the version of citizenship characteristically mobilised in the UK 
broadcasting discourse puts forward an amputated notion of citizenship – 
because insufficiently acknowledging a normative capacity to share decisions – 
a notion strongly indebted to the work of T H Marshall. 
Citizenship 
Marshall is the most cited author19 in the index to Calabrese and 
Burgelman’s collection of essays on citizenship and communications and 
Marshall’s thought is the source of the “welfarist” move characteristically 
evident in contemporary scholarly discussion of broadcasting and citizenship. 
The welfarist move, I argue, constitutes broadcasting as one of a bundle of 
welfare rights and thereby extends Marshall’s triad of rights (civic, political and 
social) to encompass additional putative broadcasting related rights. 
Calabrese usefully summarises Marshall (Calabrese and Burgelman 1999: 
261) as having defined citizenship as consisting in three elements, each realised 
at a distinct historical moment: first, civic rights (secured in Western Europe in 
the C18th); second, political rights (secured in Western Europe at the end of the 
C19th) and, third, welfare rights (secured in Western Europe in the C20th20). 
Marshall’s triadic bundle of rights (civil, political and social) provides a 
template for a number of influential accounts of citizenship and the media. 
Murdock (1999a: 29-30), for example, extends Marshall’s bundle to include a 
further putative type of right – information and cultural rights and has argued 
that “the core rationale for public service broadcasting lies in its commitment to 
providing the cultural resources required for full citizenship” (Murdock 2004: 
2). Hartley (1999: 179) further extends the definition of citizenship to include 
                         
19  Castells and Habermas score the same number of citations in the index. 
20  We may pass over this occidental perspective as not unreasonable when addressing so 
western a phenomenon – the notable oriental instances of Indian, Japanese and Taiwanese 
public service broadcasting notwithstanding. 
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not only this fourth form of citizenship, cultural citizenship, but a fifth: DIY – 
Do it Yourself – citizenship. 
Marshall and his successors thus offer a notion of citizenship as onion: 
each bundle of citizenship entitlements/attributes surrounds the others 
concentrically and in complementary and non-rival fashion. But all layers 
of the onion must putatively be present if the entitlements of citizenship are 
to be fully realised – Marshall added a third layer – social rights – to a pre-
existing two layer onion – civic and political rights – and Murdock, Hartley 
and others have added further layers (notably the cultural and/or 
informational and the DIY layers). However, these definitions do not 
include either of the two attributes of citizenship identified by Brinkmann 
in his classic commentary in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 
notably: “the notion of liberty… and membership of a political unit 
involving co-operation in public decisions as a right and sharing of public 
burdens… as a duty” (Brinkmann 1930: 471). 
Marshall’s, and post-Marshallian’s, conceptions of citizenship construct 
citizenship passively, as a series of entitlements – or as Marshall puts it 
“rights and legitimate expectations”, rather than as an active, participatory 
and creative practice.21 Citizenship is thus a condition of competence 
legitimately to make claims on others within a polity. It does not include the 
power to hold authority to account or to participate in making decisions. 
In contrast, consumer centred notions of broadcasting accountability 
have foregrounded users ability to exercise control and deploy effective 
sanctions. The Peacock Committee in 1986, in a report which remains the 
most articulate and well reasoned statement of consumer based accountability 
in broadcasting, advocated a “sophisticated market system based on consumer 
sovereignty” (Peacock 1986: para 592). Such a system would, the Committee 
argued, enlarge “the freedom of choice of the consumer” (Peacock 1986: para 
547). The Peacock Committee sought a well functioning market based 
broadcasting system because such a market was conducive to liberty, 
                         
21  Pattie, Seyd and Whitely (2004: 10) observe that “Marshall’s ‘linear, cumulative model’ of 
the development of citizenship is problematic, but is nevertheless a starting point for debates 
about contemporary citizenship in Britain”. 
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competition and markets were embraced only secondarily for their putative 
economic efficiency. 
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Consumer and citizen: concepts in action 
The terms, consumer and citizen, was embedded in UK broadcasting law 
for the first time in the Communications Act 2003 (CA 2003) which requires 
Ofcom22 to further the interests of citizens and consumers. The CA 2003 
defines “citizen” as “all members of the public in the United Kingdom” 
(1.3.14) but does not define “consumer” (though the Act attributes particular 
importance to consumers’ interests, notably “in respect of choice, price, 
quality of service and value for money” (1.3.5)). The Act requires Ofcom: 
(a) to further the interests of citizens in relation to communications 
matters; and 
(b) to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where 
appropriate by promoting competition. (CA 2003 3.1). 
Since the CA 2003 came into effect the BBC (2004a), the Government 
(DCMS 2006) and Ofcom (2004c) have all put forward accounts of 
broadcasting and citizenship. The Government’s White Paper on the future 
of the BBC “A public service for all: the BBC in the digital age” (DCMS 
2006) is representative and fills out notion of citizenship first put forward 
in the CA 2003. It identifies “sustaining citizenship and civil society” as the 
first of the six public purposes with which the BBC is charged. 
The remaining five purposes are: 
• Promoting education and learning; 
• Stimulating creativity and cultural excellence by using the licence 
fee as venture capital for creativity; 
• Representing the UK, its nations and regions; 
• Bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK; 
• Building digital Britain. 
The White Paper further elaborates the BBC’s citizenship mandate 
(DCMS 2006: 13) as a duty to: 
• Inform the public and increase understanding of the world through 
news, information and analysis of current events and ideas; 
                         
22  Ofcom, the Office of Communications, is the integrated regulator of electronic 
communications which replaced five former agencies and which was created under the 2003 
Communications Act. 
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• Set standards of quality in news and current affairs; 
• Engage the widest possible cross-section of the UK population with 
differently-targeted services, including BBC Online; 
• Continued commitment to local and regional news; 
• Stimulate engagement with social and political issues through 
programming outside news and current affairs – e.g. through themed 
seasons or campaigns; 
• Help people understand Parliament and the UK political system 
including the devolved administrations; BBC Parliament should 
continue to carry dedicated coverage of Parliamentary matters, and 
there should be regular coverage of Parliament in both news and 
other programming on mainstream channels; 
• Contribute to democratic debate in forms other than broadcast 
content – for example by organising seminars and e-discussion 
forums, distributing information and working on campaigns with 
partners in the public and voluntary sector – within clear boundaries; 
• Implement the core recommendations of the Neil report.23 
Broadcasting’s citizenship vocation is thus designated as a provision of 
information to viewers and listeners – it fits neatly the welfarist thrust of 
Marshall’s notion of modern citizenship. In contrast, when broadcasting’s 
relationship to viewers and listeners as consumers is under discussion, the 
idea of sovereignty, mobilized by the Peacock Report, is of considerable 
importance. For example, Ed Richards, Ofcom’s Chief operating Officer (and 
formerly Senior Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister for Media and earlier 
Controller of Corporate Strategy at the BBC), stated (all citations from 
Ofcom 2004c): 
As consumers, our concern is that we are supplied with what we as individuals, 
or perhaps on behalf of our families, want to watch or what we want to have an 
option to watch. 
And he further proposed, (as the Peacock Committee in 1986 had 
envisaged), that: 
                         
23  The Neil report (BBC 2004b) responded to Lord Hutton’s criticisms of BBC journalism and 
proposed measures to improve it. 
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post analogue switch off we will see the evolution of something approaching a 
reasonably well functioning market in broadcasting……. consumers, through 
their own choices will be able to express their preferences – through what they 
choose to watch, what they choose to subscribe to or what they choose to buy on 
a per view basis. 
In these representative statements by the principal policy actors 
broadcasting’s role in respect of the citizen is defined (whether broadly or 
narrowly) as the provision of socially desirable content by broadcasters. 
Whereas the relationship between broadcasting and the consumer is conceived 
normatively as one in which consumers are able to express and realise their 
preferences. The rhetorical construction of the broadcasting citizen and the 
broadcasting consumer is that being a citizen is to have provided by an 
authority: control resides outside the citizen. Whereas, being a broadcasting 
consumer is to be in control of what one watches (or listens to): control resides 
with the consumer. 
Conclusion 
The debate about the future of the BBC which took place in the UK 
throughout 2004-2006 was remarkable for its range and intensity although 
finally resulting in something very like the status quo ante for the BBC. The 
accountability of the BBC, although a matter on which both the public 
expressed its concern in the Government’s consultations and Parliamentary and 
other enquiries expressed views in the wealth of commentaries and reports 
which appeared during Charter review, remains much as it was before. True the 
Trust is charged to give viewers and listeners a better and fuller account of the 
BBC than was, and did, the Governors. True, the Trust is to be more clearly 
distinguished from the BBC management than was its predecessor and may 
therefore be better able to hold the BBC to account. But little changes in the 
crucial relationship between the user and the broadcaster. Whether as consumer 
or citizen the viewer and listener disposes of few powers to hold the BBC to 
account. 
This is because, first, the viewer and listener’s relationship to the BBC, in 
respect of formal accountability, is conceptually constructed as a relationship of 
citizenship (rather than of consumption) and because, second, there is a clear 
normative rhetoric in both scholarly and policy domains which constructs 
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broadcasting citizenship as a derivative of the content which broadcaster(s) 
provide for viewers and listeners: content the consumption of which, it’s 
assumed, will foster citizenship properties in viewers and listeners.24 This then 
is a passive conception of citizenship. Whereas the consumer of broadcasting 
is, normatively at least, able to exercise choice – s/he is constructed as an 
active agent. In consequence the viewer and listener is compelled to trust, s/he 
has neither voice nor exit and thus enjoys no alternative to loyalty. For s/he has, 
at best, only an account of the BBC given by an unchosen representative, the 
Trust, rather than the ability to hold to account which, normatively, a non-
Marshallian citizen might enjoy. 
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